1: Niederle--68 E-5 1911 E16 Slavic Peoples E16
Czechoslovakia E81

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1. Quite a long time ago I indicated the importance of this chronicler. See my Boheme pittoresque et historique (Paris, 1867).

At the beginning of the fourteenth century matters had gone so far that at the coronation of King John in 1311 the larger part of the people sang in German and the minority in Czech.

S.P. C. 175 668 [798]

Under Charles IV and his son Vaclav a reaction took place to the benefit of the Slavic element[1]. The nobility and the clergy took an interest in this. This evolution was crowned by the wars of the Hussites, who fought at the same time for Czech faith and Czech nationality. The Germans lost their influence in the towns or were completely driven out; the Czech language reassumed its place. Among the towns which became Slavic may be cited Zatec (Saaz), Litomerice (Leitmeritz), Usti nad Labem (Aussig), Dvur Kralove, Jaromer, Hradec Kralove, Nemecky Brod, Caslav, Kutna Hora, Pelhrimov, Susice, Budejovice, Kaplice, Stribro and Plzen, all of which were already Czech at the end of the fourteenth century.

/108/ At this time, in Bohemia, in Moravia, in Siberia, Czech became an official language. It was proclaimed to be the sole administrative language at Opava (Troppau) in 1431, at Tesin (Teschen) in 1434, in Moravia in 1480, in Bohemia in 1495. In short, in the course of the fifteenth century Bohemia and Moravia rapidly became Czech, the national consciousness grew stronger, all the more because germanization became weaker within the country and in the frontier districts. Nevertheless, this very brilliant period had no enduring results. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries a portion of Czech territory was again germanized as a result of the introduction of Protestantism and through the efforts of the new dynasty. Then came a long period of wars and persecutions which desolated entire regions and was followed by the new influx of German colonists from Misnie*, Voigtland*, from Franconia and from the Palatinate. Thus, at the very moment when the Czech language became official within the kingdom, when the Czech literature was flourishing, a great section of Czech soil was lost.

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S.P. C. [728]

Then came the defeat of Bila Hora (1620) and the unhappy events which placed the Czech nation in the hands of a dynasty which was German and absolutist. In 1627 a new organization was imposed

[1] [Against the influence of the German element upon the country - Analyst]

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But a new Slavonic problem was brought to the forefront—the problem of the Ukraine. A Ukrainian National Committee was formed, and began to negotiate with the Allies. Its action divided the Slavs; Poles and Russians greeted it with equal hostility; the Yugoslavs displayed disapproval or indifference; the Czechs adopted a half-and-half attitude, advocating the administrative and cultural autonomy of the Ukraine within the framework of the reviving Slav solidarity.

Moreover, it was quite natural that, once in possession of their ethno-linguistic frontiers, the Slavonic peoples should cease to have any other horizons than these frontiers, within which they still had to build up a political, economic, and social organisation. They sought their vocation in their own history. We are continually forced back to this fundamental fact—Slavism has been, in its essence and from the force of circumstances, a revolt of the nation against the State, whether the latter was called Germany, Austria, Hungary, or Turkey. In Russia itself, the Slavophile school maintained the rights of the country (*zemlia*) against the encroachments of the State. With this tendency is connected the tinge of anarchy which the West is apt to associate with the word 'Slav'. The nation, in the spirit of the 1919–1920 treaties, being identified with the State, the Slavonic idea was doomed to lose the centrifugal opposition, the dissolving power which had long characterised it, and under whose action the Habsburg Empire had collapsed.

And in fact, the triumph of the nationalities, ratified by the treaties of Saint-Germain and of Trianon, restored Slavism to its academic origins. Reminders of racial fraternity now seemed to serve no other purpose than to warm up the atmosphere for after-dinner speeches, or for inaugural meetings of congresses. The Slavonic nations lacked that basis of common culture which gives to Hispanism, for instance, the only positive value to which it can lay claim.

In the political order the counter-indications showed up all the more clearly, inasmuch as the territorial settlements were no longer made in virtue of force, but on the basis of the right of peoples to self-determination. Now there were some populations which were caught between two opposing Slavonic currents; the Teschen district of Silesia, Macedonia, the Ukraine. A cynic has remarked that, the farther the distance between Slavonic

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186* nations, the better they understand each other; witness the Poles
•728 and the Bulgarians, the Czechs and the Yugoslavs. But to say that living side by side no more ensures agreement among nations than it does among individuals is to state a commonplace.

[578] Yet the reshuffling of the map did, nevertheless, satisfy the essential aspirations of the Slavs. It gave Yugoslavia her unity, Czechoslovakia her independence, Poland her liberty. But some irredentism still remained. Bulgaria claimed Macedonia (although she had lost it before the war). The Yugoslavs regretted that the Slovenes of Istria and Carinthia had remained outside the frontiers of their State, Poland remained in dispute with Russia on her Eastern Marches, and with Czechoslovakia in the Teschen Basin. The Ukraine question was assuming a fresh form and acuteness. Even after the recasting of Eastern Europe, there still remained seeds of discord between the Slavonic nations.

131 Much more; looked at as a whole, the new map seemed to
175 be based on an age-long law which shuts the Slavs off from the sea. It was because it was cut off from all the seas that the original Slavia remained as unknown to the Ancients as Central Africa was to the Europeans of fifty years ago. One after the other the Scythians, the Sarmatians, the Goths, the Huns, the Avars, the Khazars, the Tartars, all barred them from the Black Sea. It was not until the eighteenth century that the Russians became effective masters of the northern shore of this sea. Similarly with the Baltic, where Scandinavian, Finnish, and Baltic peoples settled; until the Second World War, Leningrad was a Slavonic breach in Finnish territory. As for the White Sea, it was inaccessible to the Russians before the sixteenth century. The Finns, and perhaps the Lapps, had got in before them.

728 Now the 1919–1920 treaties took the Baltic territories and
131 Finland from Russia. They refused Danzig to Poland, Fiume
175 and Trieste to Yugoslavia. Following the coasts of the Baltic, from the borders of Esthonia to the Free Port of Danzig there was no real Slavonic port, even though the hinterland might be entirely populated with Slavs. On the Adriatic, the Dalmatian coast offered nothing but indifferent outlets, backed by steep slopes—and yet the hinterland was wholly Slavonic. The Aegean had no Slavonic outlet. The Slavs were allowed no possibility of becoming maritime powers, capable of rivalling the Germanic,

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Anglo-Saxon, or Latin nations. The treaties of the earlier war had thus sanctioned a traditional exclusiveness in this respect.

On the other hand, Slavism scored a point—the only one—in an acquisition of territory. This was achieved by the clauses which allocated to the Czechs Sub-Carpathian Russia—an ethnical mosaic, with predominant Russian or Ukrainian elements, which was to form an autonomous unit within the framework of the Czechoslovak Republic. This allocation, demanded by the Ruthenians of America, was decided upon chiefly because the signatories to the treaties considered the Prague government as the best mentor they could give to a dangerously backward Slavonic population. Indeed, Czechoslovakia was, within a few years, to improve Sub-Carpathia, that Cinderella of the Slavonic world; at the cost of heavy budgetary sacrifices, she turned this territory entrusted to her into a real 'Civilisation Front'.

As is well known, at the Peace Conference the Czechoslovaks intervened—another gesture of pure Slavonic inspiration—to try to secure for the Serbs of Lusatia the benefit of the protection accorded to minorities. These Lusatians are the remnant of a powerful tribe who people a corner of Saxony and Brandenburg, with its centre at Bautzen. Theirs was for long the *terra incognita* of the Slavonic world; they were discovered by the learned circles of Czechoslovakia and Poland in the nineteenth century.

The return of Poland to an independent life, and the Sovietisation of the Russian State, modified the nature of the relations between the two peoples. Immediately after the earlier war and the Treaty of Riga, one could not say that these relations had been clarified. It is certain that the Government of Moscow was then pursuing a Eurasiatic policy, which drew it away from European affairs. But no one could imagine that this disinterestedness would last very long. In Moscow they still, as under the Tsars, spoke of the 'Jesuitism' and the 'Jagellonism' of the Poles; in Warsaw, they talked about the hegemonic appetite of Russia, and her propaganda. 'Atheism' and 'Marxism' had replaced 'Orthodoxy' and 'Panslavism' as passwords.

The Polish-Sovietic War of 1920 complicated inter-Slav relations. The Poles bitterly reproached the Czechs with having refused

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Chapter Six

THE SLAVONIC WORLD AND THE PEACE TREATIES

186* 668

THE negotiation of the peace treaties, which occupied the whole of 1946, was both a testing-time for the solidarity of the Slavonic States, faced with international problems, and the period of their internal consolidation.

In an article published on February 3, 1947, by *Pravda*, the Russian Professor Voznesensky, Vice-President of the Panslav Committee, defined these two aspects of the post-war period for Slavs.

'The present Slav movement has no precedent in history. Our peoples have undertaken two main tasks. The first is the struggle against the traces of Fascism and the struggle for peace against political reaction. The second consists in a fraternal collaboration in the political, economic, and cultural domains, the bases of development and progress for any country'.

During this 'second phase' of the post-war period, demonstrations of Slav solidarity were to be based on two watchwords:—

(1) An almost ritual affirmation of gratitude and attachment to Soviet Russia.

(2) The external 'democratic' and 'pacific' aim of this solidarity—hence the strict avoidance of the words 'race' and 'bloc'.

In the diplomatic field the unity of view of the Slavonic peoples followed from an elementary postulate—the collapse of Teutonic power, a collapse with which their common security was bound up.

186* 648 • 728 That is why, on April 25, 1946, the eve of the opening of peace negotiations by the meeting in Paris of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the four Great Powers, the Diplomatic Editor for the Moscow Radio, Yermachov, thought it well to recall that the struggle against Teutonism was the common denominator of the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. and of the other Slav peoples:—

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'In liberating the Slavonic peoples, the Red Army has accomplished a mission of great historic import, for if they were not freed from the German yoke there could be no question of lasting peace in Europe. The relations between the U.S.S.R. and the Slavonic countries are based on common interests of defence against the revival of the German forces of aggression which have caused such prejudice to these peoples. And it is beyond doubt that their development on truly democratic bases constitutes the best pledge for peace in Europe'.

On various occasions moreover, Russia, unwilling to place her cards on the table before her great Allies did so, was known to have her views on the German problem put forward by the Poles or the Czechs, while Yugoslavia, more combative or less wary, launched, now against the English now against the Americans, offensives calculated to put them on a false scent, diverting attention from the real objectives of the diplomatic moves.

In all the discussions raised by the peace treaties, at all the meetings of the United Nations and their Commissions, the Slav delegates voted with the Soviet Union or with its Republics, whether in matters concerning general problems (such as the right of veto or disarmament) or in national 'cases', such as the ban on Franco or the Greek question; so much so that it was always possible to forecast, as soon as a debate opened, which way these delegates would vote.

Conversely, where Russia did not herself inspire the claims put forward by the small Slav States, she supported them. She backed the Yugoslavs in the dispute between Rome and Belgrade regarding the fate of Trieste and Julian Venetia, the maintenance of the Polish-Germanic frontiers on the Oder and the Neisse, and the Bulgarian-Yugoslav offensive against the Athens Government.

Ideologically, the joint attitude of the Slav Governments rested on the theory that they alone were imbued with the real democratic spirit and that the Western Powers represented a survival of reaction and of *bourgeois* Liberalism.

This naïve attitude is evident in the speeches of nearly all the Slav diplomats during this period of European reconstruction.

A Polish newspaper, *Robotnik* (of April 14, 1946), took a census of Slavonic strength on the continent of Europe:—

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ference, which, while treating her as a conquered country, nevertheless left her Southern Dobrudja which she had obtained from Rumania under a friendly agreement concluded under the auspices of the Axis.

By her memoranda addressed to the Four Powers on May 7 and June 20, she had asked to be designated in the peace treaties, not as an Axis 'Satellite State' but as a 'Co-belligerent Ally'. Her delegate to the Paris Conference maintained that the moral responsibility of the Bulgarian people had not been involved in the policy of collaboration with Germany,[11] that, moreover, no Bulgarian soldier had borne arms against the Red Army, and that the country's heroic resistance, at the critical moment of the war, entitled her to the Allies' sympathetic consideration.

This request was rejected, however, as well as that which aimed at securing access to the Aegean Sea (the famous 'outlet' of Article 48 of the Treaty of Neuilly) or, more clearly, that part of Western Thrace which had been under Bulgarian sovereignty between 1913 (Treaty of Bucharest) and 1919 (Treaty of Neuilly) and which, at the time of which we are speaking, formed part of Greece. This request, as well as the claim for indemnity for 'investments and improvements' effected by the Bulgarian troops on Greek soil during the occupation, at the Luxembourg Conference provoked vigorous reaction on the part of the Greek Premier, M. Tsaldaris, who reproached the Bulgarians with having attacked his country three times in the space of a single generation.

Much more: Messrs. Byrnes and Bevin took the opportunity of M. Kolarov's visit to Paris to intimate to him the dissatisfaction their Governments felt at the way in which the Opposition was treated in Sofia. Moreover, the British delegate demanded the insertion of a special clause intended to protect Jewish minorities, although it was well known that—except in the last war, and even then, not without the exercise of great restraint[12]—the Jews had never been the object of discriminating measures.

[11] Almost word for word, this was the thesis maintained at the end of the previous war by M. Mollov, the Bulgarian delegate to the League of Nations: 'Bulgaria . . . was drawn into the war by events contrary to the manifest will of the majority of the people, and of the political parties'.

[12] The opposition of the Bulgarian people to racial laws spared the Jews the atrocities to which they were subjected in other Eastern European countries.

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So the signature, on February 10, of the peace treaty which (except in Dobrudja) maintained the territorial *status quo* of 1919, was made under protest—on the part of the Government, which, in an official note, expressed its hope of a revision of the 'unjust clauses' of the treaty; on the part of the Homeland Front, which invited the population to 'roll up its sleeves' and work to surmount the difficulties inherent in the application of the treaty; on the part of the Opposition parties, which, while they considered the treaty contrary to the spirit of the Atlantic Charter and to the terms of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, yet blamed the Government for not having been willing to apply sincerely the Moscow agreements, nor to follow the advice of the 'democratic Great Powers'.

* * *

Poland's fundamental problem in 1946 was the reorganisation and repopulation of the western territories taken from Germany and incorporated by Poland in conformity with the decision of the Potsdam Conference of August 2, 1945, and with the Polish-Sovietic treaty of the following August 17. 'Our western frontiers', said Wladislaw Gomulka, Vice-President of the Council, 'are essential to the maintenance of peace in Europe. Any one who opposes us in this respect threatens our most vital interests, and must be considered as our enemy'.

Three million Poles repatriated from Russia were to be settled in the western territories, where they would be joined by a million and a half Poles from the interior, taken from the over-populated districts, and a million and a half repatriated exiles. Out of four million Germans liable to deportation, 2,400,000 had already been settled in the Russian-occupied zone of Germany, and one million and a quarter in the British zone. So that the total movements of population affected more than seven million individuals.

Within her new frontiers Poland included 195,000 sq. miles instead of 242,875 sq. miles that she covered before the war; her population had fallen from 35,000,000 inhabitants to 23,620,000. She no longer had on her soil any national minorities; Germans, Ukrainians, Byelo-Russians and Lithuanians were to be repatriated, where this had not already been done. As for the Jews, their number dropped from three and a half million to 86,000. Poland, which had six neighbours before the

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648 175 certain items which had appeared in the News Bulletin published by the British Embassy in Poland, and judged by official circles to be tendentious. At the beginning of September the Foreign Office announced that the Bulletin would publish no more reports concerning Poland's internal affairs. But semi-official commentators felt obliged to emphasise that this assurance, at variance with British practice, had not been given without hesitation; it had been largely prompted by fear that the Bulletin's collaborators would be arrested by the Polish authorities. So that the settlement of the dispute, by its very nature, contained the germ of future unpleasantness.

Moreover, Warsaw cherished many other bones of contention as far as the English were concerned. The latter were first accused of wanting to keep the gold belonging to the National Bank, and then reproached with supporting the Polish 'reactionaries', with refusing to repatriate General Anders' army *en bloc,* and with lending too sympathetic an ear to the complaints and recriminations of the Peasant Party. Although it was for Poland that England had entered the war, it may be said that it was against the British cabinet that the most bitter criticisms were directed by the Polish Government and press.

The attacks reached their culminating point in the autumn, after Mr. Byrnes's speech at Stuttgart on September 6, and Mr. Bevin's declaration in the House of Commons on October 22.

648 175 728 Mr. Byrnes had said: 'As regards Silesia and the other Eastern German territories, their allocation to Poland by Russia, for administrative purposes, had taken place before the Potsdam meeting. . . . As the minutes of the Conference plainly show, the heads of the Governments did not undertake to support, on the establishment of peace, the cession of any particular territory. . . . The extent of the region to be ceded to Poland must be determined at the time when the final settlement is made'.[14]

Taken in conjunction with Mr. Bevin's speech, these words could bear the interpretation that Great Britain and America would, at the time of the final Peace Conference, make the

[14] The relevant paragraph of the Potsdam agreement is worded as follows: 'The heads of the three Governments reaffirm the opinion that the final delimitation of Poland's western frontiers must be made at the time of the peace settlement'.

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question of the Oder-Neisse frontiers dependent on that of free elections. M. Molotov at once challenged Mr. Byrnes's declaration, affirming that Russia considered the Polish-German frontiers as definitive. If, on the one hand, this intervention alienated the German Communists from him, and contributed to their defeat at the municipal elections, on the other hand, it secured for him enthusiastic approbation in Polish circles. In most of the large towns popular meetings were held, and the crowds booed the name of Mr. Byrnes, and even of America.

The tension lasted right up to the elections. The arrest of members of the Polish Peasant Party had its echo in the House of Commons, where, on October 22, Mr. Churchill drew a 'sad picture' of the situation in Poland. 'We must', he said, 'take great care to distinguish in our minds between the present Polish Government and the feelings of the Polish nation, whose affliction and sufferings seem to be never-ending'. The Minister of State, Mr. McNeil, emphasised once more the fact that England was a joint signatory to the undertakings given by the Warsaw Government, and thereby bound to see that they were carried out.

So, when the legislative elections had been fixed for January 19, the Governments of London and Washington considered the time had come to repeat their representations on behalf of a free poll. On November 22, they handed over, through their representatives in Warsaw, two simultaneous notes (identical, as regards contents, with those which had been handed to Rumania and Bulgaria on previous occasions). These two documents referred to the previous warnings, and concluded by mentioning that it would be impossible for the Anglo-American democracies to recognise any Government which might be based on elections carried out with violence, or whose results had been falsified.

No reply was made to the American Department of State. That destined for the Foreign Office was delayed for a month. It answered Great Britain's arguments by setting out a complete accusation, intended to show that that Power had herself deliberately violated the Yalta and Potsdam agreements in seven respects, as under:—

1. Role of 'advisers to the British Government' played by Polish exiles in London.

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for Foreign Affairs spoke in similar vein in the House of Commons. And the final result of all this fuss was simply that England and the United States were not represented at the inaugural session of the Third Polish Republic, held on February 4. Moreover, that did not prevent those two countries from offering their congratulations, the next day, to M. Boleslaw Bierut, President of the Republic. London and Washington had never had any other concern than that of 'saving appearances'. They knew quite well that these platonic manifestations of displeasure would have no other effect than to consolidate Muscovite influence in Warsaw.

The Presidency of the new Government was entrusted to a young member of the Cracow bar—M. Joseph Cyrankiewicz, General Secretary of the Socialist Party, and a survivor of the Auschwitz Camp. In May, political life was gradually becoming normal. The President of the Republic compared it to a river 'which, after having been diverted from its bed by a cataclysm, was finding its true course again'.

To the new Cabinet was to fall the mission of getting the Oder-Neisse frontier sanctioned by the Peace Conference. In its own view, as well as that of the whole of Poland, the question was settled by the fact that transfers of population had already taken place, without any protests from London or Washington. It was difficult to conceive that millions of Displaced Persons would be compelled to undergo a fresh exodus. The Anglo-Americans would therefore be obliged, in Mr. Churchill's phrase, 'to write off Eastern Europe on the Profit and Loss account'. Moreover, France supported the Polish viewpoint; on February 19, 1947, she signed a cultural agreement with Warsaw—the preface to a new political pact, it being understood that Poland would support her claims on the Saar, as she would back up those of Poland to the maintenance of her western frontier. The question of the frontiers gave rise, in April, 1947, to a bitter and sterile passage-of-arms between Americans and Russians at the Moscow Conference.

Another and no less redoubtable motive of discord between

dates which fell to the Socialo-Communist bloc which backs the regime of Bierut and Osubka-Morawski. So the Moscow-controlled parties get 400 out of the 444 seats in the Polish Diet. . . . The last vestiges of Polish liberty, for which General Sikorski is still fighting, will tend to disappear'.

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the agreement, and should furnish the United States with full details of treaties concluded with other Powers. 648 175 457

Since these conditions had not been fulfilled, America announced, in the month of May, that she was reconsidering the matter. Warsaw then communicated the text of the commercial treaties concluded with the neighbouring countries. The fact that, after this, the United States restored the credit of ninety million dollars shows that they did not consider these treaties as incompatible with their collaboration in Polish economic recovery. In January, 1947, Polish assets in America —including gold—were 'de-blocked', in consideration of an agreement fixing the indemnification of American nationals who owned nationalised Polish concerns.

But the question of the elections remained as a background to the feeling of strain which hung over the relations between Washington and Warsaw. In March, 1947, it came to the fore again, when the United States ambassador, Mr. Arthur Bliss Lane, resigned as an expression of the disapproval he had never ceased to exhibit towards a régime resulting from an electoral consultation which he had designated 'a farce'. Far from disowning him, Mr. Truman, in accepting his resignation, declared his regret that 'his skilful representation of the American Government's views had not attained its object'.

The financial negotiations with England experienced similar vicissitudes. The agreement of June 24, 1946, for the grant of a loan, subject to the repayment of the debts of the former London Government, was at first postponed; official Polish circles accused Great Britain of retaining the greater part of their compatriots' assets as security for her claims, and especially the 4,800,000,000 francs (gold) belonging to the Bank of Poland. On December 19, the English Embassy in Warsaw was obliged to protest against the manner in which these questions were presented by the Polish press, who took pleasure in contrasting the British claims with Russia's gesture in wiping out Poland's war debts.

We have recalled that one of the sore points in Slav solidarity was the question of the allocation of the Teschen Basin, occupied by the Poles since October 2, 1938. The question had already, between the two wars, caused a lot of ink to flow. It had grafted itself on to attacks made by the Polish press against 648 728 175

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Prague's policy with regard to the Slovaks, and by the Czech press against Warsaw's treatment of the Ukrainian minorities.

At the end of 1945 the Polish Government had proposed a general settlement of matters outstanding. Prague had agreed in principle, but excluding territorial questions. Poland rejected this reservation. Negotiations opened in Prague on February 7, 1946. The Czechs again refused to have the question of Teschen reopened; they were anxious not to jeopardise the promise made by the Allies to restore their frontiers as they were before Munich.

So the matter was adjourned. But neither of the two Governments neglected any occasion of reaffirming their country's rights to Teschen.

'The Government of Poland' (said M. Rzymowski, Minister of Foreign Affairs, on March 8) 'most emphatically condemns the violence of Munich exercised by Hitler in common with Beck, Poland's Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1938–1939, towards Czechoslovakia, a friendly country. I cannot, however, forbear to mention the fact that Silesian Teschen is peopled by a mass of 100,000 Poles who, for some decades, and especially during the six years of the German occupation, by their attitude affirmed their desire to be reincorporated in the mother country'.

To which the President of the Czech Council, M. Fierlinger, replied, recalling that this territory contained the richest coal-mines of Czechoslovakia, that the country's industry had been particularly developed there, large capital sums having been invested, and that along the Polish-Czech frontier passed the most important of the railways joining Bohemia and Moravia to Slovakia. 'So', he concluded, 'any cession of the territory of Teschen to the Poles would prejudice the most vital interests of our country. For these motives, as well as for ethnical reasons, we cannot discuss with the Polish Government the cession of any of these territories. Naturally, we are ready to come to an agreement with the Poles on the most friendly basis, regarding any other arrangement which would suit them, particularly for a reciprocal exchange of population which might finally settle this very complicated problem, to the interest of both countries'.

The most curious part was that the two Governments, equally intractable on this point, showed themselves none the less disposed to conclude an alliance, even a federal pact. Poland would have seen in this a way of submerging the importance of

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the Teschen affair. But Czechoslovakia kept the two matters distinct, and was not prepared to raise the question of the pact until the frontier dispute had been settled.

Marshal Tito was either asked, or was tempted, to offer his mediation. He met with no better success than M. Benes had encountered when, immediately after the previous war, he had tried to intervene between Belgrade and Sofia to appease the Macedonian quarrel. It was obvious, moreover, that the real arbitrator of the dispute could be none other than Stalin. And so the question of Teschen headed the agenda of the conversations that took place in Moscow, in June, 1946, between M. Fierlinger and the Russian and Polish chiefs. The last-named maintained that the territorial sacrifices they had made to Russia should be compensated with the territories partly populated by Poles. The Czechs showed themselves adamant. Had not they, too, ceded Sub-Carpathia to the Russians, and without any compensation? They formulated, or allowed to be formulated, other demands—a frontier-rectification, to do away with the two salients of Glatz and Ratibor, the incorporation of Lusatia with Bautzen, Loebau and Cottbus, and the incorporation of the Austrian town of Gmünd (already occupied).

The Soviet representatives dismissed both parties non-suited. Probably they were not sorry to preserve a possible means of bringing pressure to bear on both sides. They did, however, assure the Czechs that the question would not be settled by Moscow without their consent. As for the Poles, they saw in the Czech claims to Glatz a move to give them a possible basis for bargaining.

The Western Allies prudently refrained from intervening in this dispute, although it affected both the political and the economic balance of the Continent.

Eventually on March 10, 1947, Poles and Czechs concluded a treaty of alliance that stabilised their relations, but, trusting to the effects of time, left them until 1949 to settle the matter of Teschen—the very one whose settlement was of paramount importance for those relations!

The Polish delegation to the Peace Conference expressed very precise views on the fate of Austria and Germany. They demanded guarantees against a fresh Anschluss, the unity of the Reich to be subject to effective demilitarisation and denazifica-

tion, and the reconstruction of German economic life subordinated to the reconstruction of the devastated countries.

On the United Nations' Security Council the Polish delegation fastened on the Spanish problem, displaying all the more energy, inasmuch as none of their positive interests was at stake. They backed the views supported by France and the Soviet Union on rupture with Franco, and decided, on April 5, 1946, to recognise the Giral Government--an eminently platonic gesture, for Franco's Spain and Poland had no diplomatic relations.

The religious question, too, was a serious preoccupation of the Government, which refuted the widespread accusation of wishing to persecute the Catholic Church. It had, moreover, always included 'practising' Catholics among its members, for Poland is certainly one of the few countries where 'Leftists' are just as good Catholics as 'Rightists'. Cardinal Hlond, Primate of Poland and Archbishop of Warsaw, himself declared that, in spite of the denunciation of the Concordat of 1925, and the absence of relations between Chruch and State, there was no question of a Kulturkampf in Poland.

There is no doubt; however, that the law (which came into force on January 1, 1946) rendering civil marriage compulsory and authorising divorce conflicted with the consciences of a large section of the population. The education reforms had dealt a death-blow to the religious schools. In the face of these measures, the Church adopted an attitude of restrained disapproval, in order not to make the situation worse; moreover, she had her 'Red Bishops', such as Mgr. Adamski, Bishop Katowice, whose sympathies were known to lie with the Soviet Union.

One of the reasons why the hierarchy avoided clashes was the fear of reviving accusations brought against certain of their members as the result of their attitude during the occupation; this in spite of the courageous conduct of the enormous majority of the prelates, and the murder by the Germans of four bishops and two thousand priests.

It was, moreover, evident that the Warsaw Government's hostility was directed less against the Polish Church than against the Vatican, which they reproached with its policy during the war and its attitude in certain actions brought against agents of the occupying authorities. Yet M. Osubka-Morawski likewise

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sent as Papal Nuncio. In November, Mgr. Joseph Beran, a Dachau deportee, was appointed Archbishop of Prague. Czechoslovakia was then the only Slav State having accredited diplomatic representation with the Holy See.

In Slovakia the clergy had to suffer from the fact that a priest, Joseph Tiso,[21] who succeeded Father Hlinka as Leader of a Peoples' Party, had controlled the so-called 'Independent' State under the Nazi occupation. In some cases, proceedings against 'collaborators' took on the aspect of an anti-Catholic drive; some Associations, and even some religious communities, were dissolved.

As regards foreign policy during this period, it was dominated by two questions, the claim on Teschen and the 'liquidation' of the Hungarian minorities. The Teschen problem has been dealt with above, in connection with Poland; we will simply remind the reader that the Prague Government was adamant in its claim. 'Czechoslovakia will not give up one scrap of Teschen', declared President Benes on July 18, 1946. The treaty of alliance of March 10 left the matter in suspense until 1949.

The evacuation of the Hungarian populations raised a bitter and prolonged dispute between Prague and Budapest.

An agreement concluded on February 27, 1946 provided for an exchange between Hungarians in Slovakia and Slovaks in Hungary, on a parity basis, to the number of 150,000 persons. The Government of Budapest was to make this agreement widely known amongst the Slovaks placed under its jurisdiction.

But the intention of the Czechs was to expel from their territory the whole of the Hungarian minority, which was far more numerous than the Slovak minority in Hungary.[22] And so they asked that country to take over 200,000 other members of the Magyar minority, and a further 60,000 Hungarian minority subjects, expelled as war criminals or political offenders. The Hungarians in Czechoslovakia who might escape these various transfers would be 're-Slovacised', and would cease to enjoy any minority privileges. Prague emphatically insisted that

[21] His trial opened on December 2, 194(5?) before the High Court of Bratislava.

[22] Out of the 645,000 Magyars who lived in Czechoslovakia in 1939, 110,000 were in Carpathian Ruthenia, ceded to the Russians. There remained 435,000, more than half of whom were considered to be 'inassimilable'.

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the minorities had been the instrument which had upset and dismembered Czechoslovakia, and that their complete elimination was an essential condition for the security of the new State.

Hungary resisted this claim. Apart from general humanitarian considerations, she maintained that it was economically impossible for her to meet the needs of such an increased population. First she asked for a frontier revision, which was categorically refused by Prague. Later on, the two Governments accused each other of sabotaging the February agreements. A joint commission was set up, to accelerate the exchange. Its work was interrupted in September, when the Czechs presented a demand for the expulsion of a further 70,000 persons. In that same month the matter was taken before the Political and Territorial Commission, charged by the Peace Conference with the preparation of the treaty with Hungary; it was connected with a Czech request for frontier rectification (extension of Bratislava on the right bank of the Danube)—a request which was naturally resisted by the Hungarians. The Commission, setting aside forcible solutions, urged the two countries to come to a direct understanding on the problems of the minorities; should such an agreement not be reached within six months, Czechoslovakia would be authorised to lay the matter before the Council of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs.[23]

The dispute broke out again in November, when the Hungarians remaining in Czechoslovakia were requisitioned and transferred, for the most part, to the Sudetenland, in virtue of the law for the mobilisation of man-power. A demand from Budapest for an explanation, dated March 23, was left unanswered by Prague, where it was considered that a general measure needed no justification. On November 21 the Hungarian National Assembly registered a solemn protest against these forcible displacements. This protest was echoed abroad, particularly in London, in the House of Lords, and in a section of the English and American press, which felt obliged to remind

[23] The *Magyar Hirlap*, the organ of the Prime Minister, Nagy, published an article on the Hungarian-Czechoslovak relations containing the following remarks: 'Between the two World Wars, the Government of Hungary considered that it ought to be the ally of the power which was the enemy of Czechoslovakia; but later on, it was realised that this power was the common enemy, and had enslaved Hungary as well as Czechoslovakia'.

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the Prague Government that the sufferings inflicted on the Hungarians did not compensate for those the Slovaks had endured; they simply increased the total amount of suffering.

Negotiations between the two Governments were resumed in January, 1947, following the visit of the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Gyöngyösy, to Bratislava, where he met the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, M. Clementis, and had with him a preliminary discussion in view of a general settlement of the problem. At that time a total of 11,655 Slovaks (as against the agreed figure of 40,000) had returned to Slovakia from Hungary; of these 3,535 had not been officially transferred, but had simply fled.

Exchanges of population were resumed from April 11 to 18, but on a very small scale, while settlement was taking place, in Bratislava, of the financial problems raised by these operations.

In the whole matter, Czechoslovakia had had Russia behind her. 'We have the support of the Soviet Union in the question of the minorities', said M. Gottwald. But we should fall short of the truth were we to omit to mention that Czechoslovakia's conduct was rather severely judged in the Anglo-American countries, where people were not very familiar with minority disputes, and attached too much importance to respect for the individual, to approve of these mass exoduses—at least in Europe.

The case of the German minority had been the object of Czechoslovak declarations, even before the end of the war, and on this point the Potsdam agreements had merely had to sanction the decision taken by M. Benes and his Ministers to create a homogeneous national State. Consequently, the expulsion of the Germans from the Sudetenland did not give rise to any disputes—eliciting, at the most, humanitarian recommendations on the part of the Western Allies. The 'ceiling' for the expulsions had been fixed at 2,500,000 by the Potsdam agreements; in October, 1946, 750,000 had been sent into the Russian zone, 1,415,135 into the American zone, and 310,000 were authorised to remain on Czech territory; these were skilled workmen, miners, anti-Fascists, relatives of Czechs, old or sick people.[24] There is no

[24] It should be noted that Czechoslovakia adopted a special treatment for Germans of Austrian nationality residing or temporarily domiciled in her territory. She did not class them with the Sudeten Germans as necessarily to be expulsed, unless they had been members of the Nazi Party.

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doubt that, although their departure corresponded to a legitimate policy of internal peace and security, yet it created in Czech economic life a void that was difficult to fill.

The Americans' remarks on the subject of the deportations were not the only cause (and, in any case, they were passing ones) of the frigid relations between themselves and the Prague Government. The latter had negotiated and obtained a loan of fifty million dollars from the Export-Import Bank—a loan which was to help to finance the 'two-year plan' for Czechoslovakia's economic reconstruction. On October 16 the State Department notified that they had blocked this credit for an indefinite period, because the borrowing country had not provided any compensation for American nationals dispossessed by nationalisation. Another argument advanced was the cutting and, at the very least, injudicious tone adopted by certain Czech newspapers which, at the very moment when their Government was seeking financial aid, accused the United States of using credits as an instrument of economic imperialism. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs blamed the Russians for the latter accusation and expressed regret at Washington's decision.

On the other hand, in November, 1946, England granted a loan of two and a half million sterling, spread over four years, to enable Czechoslovakia to buy surplus British materials. So that Prague's fears of a synchronised Anglo-American policy in the matter of loans were allayed.

Like those of Poland, Czechoslovakia's aims in the discussion on the German treaty were chiefly directed towards disarmament and denazification of the Reich. For the Czechs, the problem of their security was partly settled by the presence of Soviet Russia in the Danube Basin. The dream of one of their thinkers had come true: 'The lime, our Slavonic emblem,[23] is supported by the powerful Russian oak'. And, celebrating the anniversary of the pact of December 12, 1943, between Stalin and Benes, the *Nurodni Ozvobozeni* declared: 'Treaties are usually entered into for a fixed period. Afterwards, they are extended, or they lapse. This one must stand for eternity'.

[23] The lime was the emblem of the Slavs. At the time of the riots which took place in Ljubljana at the beginning of this century between German and Slovene students, the former sported a cornflower and the latter a lime-leaf.

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Relations between the two countries, intimate in the political domain, developed mainly in the direction of a closer economic collaboration. To this end, commercial agreements were signed at Moscow in April, and especially in July, 1946, between Gottwald, the Prime Minister, and Marshal Stalin. It was during this interview that the Czech statesmen communicated the text of their proposals for the Peace Conference.

These proposals included demands for frontier rectifications, already formulated on May 31, 1945, and reproduced in a memorandum of January 20, 1947, especially as regards the German districts of Glatz and Ratibor, occupied by the Poles. It was an attempt to do away with the two 'notches' formed in the frontier by the upper valley of the Oder (Moravian Gate) and that of the Neisse (Nahod Gap) which had been used in 1866 by von Moltke's army. Thus the roads of approach from Prussian Silesia towards Moravia would be closed. As seen above, these claims had aroused unfavourable reaction in Warsaw.

A few words on the relations between Prague and Paris. As early as October 7, the Czech Government had been in touch with General de Gaulle, who declared the Munich agreements void . . . on the following September 29. On August 22, 1944, the French and the Czech Governments agreed that, when the time was ripe, they would adapt their former pact of alliance to the needs of the existing situation. A 'joint declaration', communicated to the press on February 14, 1947, announced the early conclusion of the new pact.

The peace treaties signed in Paris on February 10, 1947, established a fresh balance of forces on the Continent.

If, treating the territorial alterations occurring between 1938 and 1944 as accidents, we superimpose the 1947 map on that of 1938 (which resulted from the treaties that settled the First World War), we find that this new balance results much less from territorial changes than from a reconstitution of influence.

The territorial changes are indeed unimportant, in comparison with the transformations which the treaties of 1919–1920 made in the map, when the dislocation of Austria-Hungary resuscitated two historic States in the heart of Europe. It is not impossible that, in times to come, the short period between the

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two wars may be regarded as the golden age of the nationalities —the brief realisation of an age-long dream.

If we take the Continent as a whole, although one independent State (Montenegro) then disappeared, eight new nationalities acquired their sovereignty—Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary. And Yugoslavia formed a unitary monarchy around Serbia.

In 1947 the Baltics disappeared from the map as independent States. No fresh creation arose from the treaties, which were limited, as far as Austria and Hungary were concerned, to restoring the *status quo*.

So we might perceive, cast over the new state of affairs, the shadow of Munich and of the decisions taken at the time when the Axis was all-powerful; the amputation of Poland was provided for by the Moscow Treaty of August 21, 1939, that of Rumania stipulated in the ultimatum of June 26, 1940, and in the Treaty of Craïova of September 7, 1940; Poland had been established in the Teschen Basin since October, 1938.

The only countries to come out of these treaties with enlarged territory were Yugoslavia, who advanced in Istria and in Julian Venetia, and Bulgaria, who, getting out of an unlucky adventure very well for once, annexed Southern Dobrudja.

The other nationalities of Central and Eastern Europe were seriously amputated. Rumania lost, with the Dobrudja, Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, and the Moldavian district of Herzea—at least one-fifth of her territory. She could, it is true, console herself with the thought that Poland—for whom the Allies went to war—lost just as much (her area was reduced from 242,875 sq. miles to 195,000 sq. miles) and that Czechoslovakia, the victim of Munich, found herself, by the loss of Carpatho-Ruthenia, reduced by one-tenth of her pre-war surface.

So that, out of five Slavonic States, three (counting Russia) were enlarged, two others amputated.

In flagrant violation of Article 2 of the Atlantic Charter, no referendum preceded these transfers of sovereignty. In cases where the new state of affairs created or maintained, ethnical pockets, this was remedied by transfers of population. So, hundreds of thousands of persons were 'displaced', in order to achieve a racial unity within the framework of the new frontiers.

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Human exoduses afforded the solution of the minority problems, which the 1919–1920 treaties had endeavoured to settle by the establishment of *ad hoc* international law. In short, it was a return to the policy of Maria Theresa and Joseph II. In this conception of European statics lay the sole innovation brought about by the latest peace treaties. Is it progress or the reverse? Whatever we may think, from the humane point of view, of this over-simplified settlement of a complex problem, we are obliged to admit that, as time goes on, it will consolidate the physical bases of the new order and ensure its duration.

Let us hasten to add, however, that scarcely were the treaties signed, when a campaign for their revision was launched. For perhaps the first time in history, this campaign included victors and vanquished, victims and beneficiaries of the new state of affairs. The Yugoslavs maintained their claim to Julian Venetia, Carinthia, and, more discreetly (at least before the international forum), to Aegean or Greek Macedonia. The Bulgarians returned to the attack, with a view to obtaining a territorial outlet on the Aegean—a claim they had relentlessly pressed between the two wars. Hungary, who again saw Eastern Transylvania eluding her grasp, maintained her traditional attitude on revision. It was difficult for Rumania to forget that, after Germany, she was the chief victim of the war. If Polish official circles, for reasons easily understood, did not raise their voices, it was not because that country willingly accepted the loss of her Eastern Marches, whose inhabitants had been 'invited' to settle on the evacuated borders of Prussia and Silesia.

The 1947 treaties settled the two problems on which formerly depended the peace of Europe—the relative strengths of the Germany-Poland-Russia trinomial, and Balkan equilibrium.

Both these problems were settled, without right of appeal, by Russia, the victorious liberator. The axiom formulated by M. Gyöngösy, a Hungarian Minister, applies here: 'In crucial periods of her history, a small nation has no liberty of choice'.

The first of these problems was solved in such a way as to ensure security for Poland, at the price of her diplomatic liberty. It used to be maintained in Warsaw that the Poles could be fully masters of their fate only on condition that Germany and Russia should be neither allies nor enemies—a formula which was as

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Chapter Eight

SLAV SOLIDARITY BREAKS UP

WE have already spoken of the resurrection of the Slavonic idea during the Second World War—the only European conflict in history which found all the Slavs on the same side of the fence. We reviewed the congresses of 1942–1945 which restated the old themes of Slav solidarity, based on the liberating role of Soviet Russia. Never had such unanimity been shown within the Slav community. For the first time 'Panslavism' could be spoken of as a reality in international life.

This 'Panslavism', uniting the oppressed, occupied peoples against Hitler's Reich, was not to last long. It made itself felt again in 1946 and 1947, but in a purely oratorical form, and exclusively in justification of Russian ascendancy over the countries of Eastern Europe. In reality, it was again the Slavs who benefited least from the victory. While it is true that Bulgaria came out of the war with enlarged territory, this was due to an agreement concluded under the auspices of the Axis Powers. Czechoslovakia and Poland suffered the loss of a large part of their eastern territories. Yugoslavia recovered part of Istria, but her claims to Trieste and Southern Carinthia met with opposition from the Western powers, and were backed by the Russians only within the limits of their own interests. The state of affairs created by the Soviet Union within the area subject to its influence failed to reflect any Slavonic trend, or any preferential treatment for the 'sister nations'.

The Kremlin is aware that the Slavonic world is an object of aversion to the Rumanians and the Hungarians. It can retain these in its orbit (into which it will try to attract Greece) only by lulling to sleep the old Slavophile ideology, or by relegating it to the rank of 'romantic values'. It is to the collaboration of Slavs and non-Slavs on the basis of Lenin-Stalinist Marxism that the Kremlin looks, for the creation of an eastern community modelled on its own institutions and obedient to its watchwords. From 1946 onwards its whole policy, in this part of Europe, aimed at directing the guidance of the satellite States more and more into the hands of the Communists. This policy was to be

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Congregation of the Holy Office, forbidding the publication and diffusion of Communist doctrine.

So the *Kulturkampf* was waged, now energetically, now quietly. The Prague Government was accused by the American Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, of violating 'human dignity and civilisation'; once more the conflict passed from the national to the international level, symbolising the ideological antagonism which exists between the Soviet world and the Western democracies. Neither the Government nor the clergy showed any signs of weakening. On November 17 the bishops again asked the civil power to abandon the laws relating to religious teaching, as conceived by the State, and the interference of lay authorities in the nomination of priests and the administration of Church property.

The end of the year 1949 was marked by waves of purges in Communist circles, and by fresh trials on charges of treason, incriminating, like those of Budapest and Sofia, Tito's 'agents' or 'accomplices'.

* * *

During this period politics in Poland were somewhat less sensational than in the other Slav countries. There again, however, the régime of 'popular democracy' evolved in the direction of Stalin-Marxism. The struggle against the Church was less open, and did not, as in Czechoslovakia, go to the length of making the clergy civil servants. The Government concentrated its efforts particularly on increasing exports, on economic reconstruction, and on exploiting the German lands brought under its control—and these efforts, it must be admitted, were attended with remarkable results.

The German Question was its chief external problem; in its view, it was France's policy in respect of the Reich which prevented the renewal of the Franco-Polish treaty of alliance. What Warsaw particularly feared was lest a change of attitude on the part of the Allies towards Germany should reopen the question of the Oder-Neisse frontier, which the Poles considered sacrosanct, but which transferred to them territories whose final allocation was, legally, postponed until the making of the peace treaty for the Reich.

The most sensational event was the nomination (on November 7)[1] of Rokossovsky, the Soviet Marshal (of Polish[2]

1 [1949 -- Analyst]

2 [1949 -- Analyst]

and Moravia including the Czech part of old Silesia). Adjacent to this compact area, there are small Czech communities in Kladsko and Upper Silesia (both belonging to present-day Poland). (9) SLOVAK is the predominant native language of Slovakia (an autonomous part of Czechoslovakia). In Europe Czech is spoken by over 8½ million and Slovak about 3 million people.

Southern Slavs. (10) SLOVENIAN is spoken in the Slovenian People's Republic (an autonomous unit within Yugoslovia) and in small adjacent areas of Austria and Italy. (11) SERBO-CROATIAN covers the greatest part of Yugoslavia: Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Croatia. In the Europe of 1940 Slovenian was spoken by almost 1½ million and Serbocroatian by some 11 million people. The standard language of the Greek Orthodox Serbs and the Catholic Croats is the same, except for a few lexical variations and the adaptation of the Russian alphabet by the former and of the Latin by the latter. (12) MACEDONIAN is the prevailing language of the Macedonian People's Republic (an autonomous unit within Yugoslavia). The central dialect, belonging to the Western Macedonian group, has recently been elevated to the status of a standard language. There are about a million native Macedonians including those in the adjacent areas of Bulgaria and Greece. (13) BULGARIAN is the dominant language in Bulgaria. At the end of 1940 it was spoken by about 6 million people in Europe including Bulgarian colonies in the USSR and Bulgars in the part of Dobrudja that remained under Rumania.

Incomplete data on the extent of some of the Slavic languages in the United States are given in the 1940 census: 585,080 people with Russian as their mother-tongue; 83,000 (?) with Ukrainian; 2,416,320 with Polish; 520,440 with Czech; 484,360 with Slovak; 178,640 with Slovenian; 153,080 with Serbocroatian. From the Canadian census of 1951 we may cite the following figures indicating the mother tongue: Ukrainian, 352,323; Polish, 129,238; Slovak, 45,516; Russian, 39,223; Serbocroatian, 11,031.

As a consequence of World War II, western Byelo-Russia was detached from Poland, and the western Ukrainian areas from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania and were incorporated into

728 the USSR; the Polish and Kashubian sections of Germany passed to Poland; some Slovenian and Croatian dominions of Italy to Yugoslavia; and a part of Dobrudja was returned from Rumania 162 to Bulgaria. The total number of Slavs in the world is now over 198 200 million. Except for a few border minorities and Americans with Slavic mother-tongues, all Slavic peoples, save the Sorbs, live in states with a Slavic majority and state language—USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria.

197 Between the three Eastern Slavic languages there are intermediate dialectal areas. Russian is divided into Northern, Southern and transitional (Middle Russian) dialects, each of them with archaic islets presenting salient common features. Ukrainian dialects are classified into Northern, Southeastern, Southwestern, and Carpathian groups; the marginal dialects (called Rusnak) of the latter group are Slovak-influenced. Byelo-Russian is divided into two dialects—the Northeastern and the Southwestern, disclosing a stronger Polish impact. Polish contains, besides various border dialects, two fundamental groups: Great and Little Polish in the Northwest and Southeast respectively. Kashubian comprehends two types of dialects: the Southern, and the Northern, which includes Slovincian. In Czech there are Bohemian, Central Moravian, and Silesian groups, with transitional dialects from group to group and from Czech to Slovak and to Polish. Slovak consists of three dialectal types: Central; Western, closely linked with Czech; and Eastern, connected with Polish and Ukrainian. Slovenian exhibits great dialectal variety. Serbocroatian from East to West presents three basic groups: Štokavian, Čakavian, and Kajkavian which is transitional to Slovenian. Bulgarian is divided into three basic dialects: Western, Northeastern, and Southeastern. Macedonian sets up a scale of intermediary dialectal zones between West Bulgarian and Štokavian.

PROTOSLAVIC; EXPANSION

PROTOSLAVIC (Primitive Slavic), which substituted (1) *s*, *z* for advanced *k*, *g*, and (2) *x* for the old *s* preceded by *i*, *u*, *r*, *k*, was a Western offshoot of the satem-group of Indo-European languages